

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #1025-79/1

28 February 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 27 February with the NIO/AF as chairman and rapporteur. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further to you.


William Parmenter

Attachment

MEMO FOR: DCI
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

NFAC #1025-79/1
28 February 1979

Distribution:

Original - Addressee (w/att - NFAC #1025-79)
1 - DDCI (w/att)
1 - DD/NFA (w/att)
1 - ER
1 - NFAC/RI
1 - NIO/AF

28 February 1979
NFAC #1025-79

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 4

USSR/CUBA

Analysts remain much of the same mind as last month, that the Soviets and Cubans appear satisfied with their general strategy and posture regarding African problems, and we do not foresee Soviet or Cuban initiatives of a new kind during the next two or three months. We remain concerned, of course, that the Rhodesian situation may evolve in such a way that a relatively rapid expansion of Soviet/Cuban presence could occur, possibly at the same time as draw-downs in Cuban forces in Ethiopia or Angola, and analysts point out that even a relatively small increment of Cubans (say 1,000-2,000) injected into Mozambique or Zambia to provide more credible anti-aircraft defense of guerrilla camps could be an important, even critical, factor in the ability of the Rhodesians to continue to strike the guerrilla base areas at will. In general, however, it was felt that the Cubans themselves would try to avoid or postpone moves of this kind if at all possible until after the non-aligned summit in Havana next September.

RHODESIA

Although we recognize the importance of developments between now and the elections scheduled for the latter half of April (and the installation of a new government sometime in May), at this meeting we focused on concerns for the period after a new "internal" government is installed, assuming, as virtually all analysts now do, that this will happen. Analysts look at this future period from a number of different viewpoints, and hence express a number of different concerns:

- in one view, if the guerrilla war continues and international acceptance does not appear in prospect, a fresh exodus of whites could begin as early as the beginning of June and the situation start to slip away from the new government fairly rapidly thereafter;
- alternatively, in the view of at least one analyst, the election and installation process may appear to be such a success that

* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

whites and internal blacks will be so heartened and the guerrillas rendered so ineffective that the guerrillas will feel they have no option but to seek Soviet/Cuban help on a scale sufficient to tip the situation their way; lifting sanctions could contribute to this development;

- another view is that the internal process by itself, regardless of how successful it is perceived to be from outside, will result in a black government that is more intransigent in negotiations with the guerrilla leaders than Smith has been; a kind of corollary to this is the possibility that a black government would feel less restraint in using the security forces (still white-led) against the national, as distinct from the guerrilla, military bases in Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana or Angola and would thus escalate the struggle both militarily and politically.

NAMIBIA

We have no fresh thoughts, but continue to regard the UN operations and subsequent developments as fraught with difficulties and in continuing danger of breakdown.

ANGOLA

The NIO professed concern that Neto's efforts to broaden Angola's contacts with Western Europe, China, and the US might arouse the Soviets and/or Cubans to begin to try to undermine him. Analysts see no evidence for this, however, and question the thesis; some would argue that the Soviet/Cuban position in Angola is so strong at present that they need not be concerned about the kinds of contacts Neto is making -- indeed, the Soviets at least might be encouraging him to lighten the economic burden with Western European, if not US, aid.

ZAIRE

The situation in Zaire both worries and frustrates the analysts. All the classical elements of collapse seem to be present, but the track record of Mobutu's enemies is so poor that we cannot point to a person, place, or time which would enable us to say "here it goes." Certainly there is at least an even chance, possibly more, that a Shaba III will occur in some form -- not necessarily as an "invasion" from outside -- during this year if the Inter-African Force is withdrawn. There almost certainly will be some kind of rioting in Kinshasa, but we cannot forecast when this might translate into a political move against Mobutu. But successive alarms and excursions, even though they have no immediate consequences, are likely to have a cumulative effect of weakening Mobutu's hold on the governmental fabric, flimsy as that is.

ETHIOPIA

Analysts see the Ethiopian leaders shifting fairly rapidly from an essentially defensive attitude toward one of much greater confidence, even assertiveness, in their international relations. If this continues to develop, as we think likely, it will have substantial impact on the other governments and situations in the Horn region (including the Arabian Peninsula). Siad's position in Somalia could become more actively threatened, as might the French balancing act in Djibouti. Kenya is already running a bit scared of the Ethiopians, although still glad to cooperate with them against Somalia. The major immediate impact of the Ethiopians' new confidence, however, is on Sudan, in connection with Sudan's long standing support for the Eritrean separatists.

SUDAN

The analysts have a sense that pressures of various kinds, not all of them fully visible to us, are growing on Numayri. While nobody foresees his fall anytime soon, we think we detect signs that his position is weakening, and that he has carried the reasonable and conciliatory policies of the past few years about as far as they can take him at this stage. The Ethiopian threats are one more problem, coming at a bad time.

CHAD

We sense that the troubles in Chad, which would appear to involve both a kind of success for Islamic elements and a failure of sorts for French politico-military tactics, may be beginning to have a broader impact, which we are not now able to gauge. The situation here is one of the sources of pressure on Sudan, and the Libyan involvement in Chad makes it more serious, since Qaddafi is also hostile to Numayri. The Chad problem itself is of course of very long standing; the background against which the events there occur is what is changing, particularly the growing activism of the Libyans along the southern shores of the Sahara.

MAURITANIA

Analysts see some possibility, though not an imminent one, that "black Moors" and "white Moors" (the former including ex-slaves of the latter), could ultimately turn to outside elements for support against each other's claims to pieces of the Mauritanian action. This could involve Senegal, on the "black" side, and Polisario on the "white" if developments move that far. This is yet another kind of north-south division in an African Sahel country with few resources.

TANZANIA-UGANDA

We cannot see much of longer-term importance coming out of Uganda, even assuming that Amin does depart the scene in some fashion; turbulence there will continue to endanger the remaining American and other foreign nationals. We are a little worried, on the other hand, about the impact of the war in Tanzania. While there are no signs of this yet, a military victory could enhance the position and prestige of the army vis-a-vis other elements in a not very successful society. Economic analysts do not see the costs of the war to Tanzania as a major factor -- how much broker can you get?

CAPE VERDE

In our first memorandum last fall, we noted reports of Soviet efforts to gain a broader foothold and perhaps facilities in Cape Verde; we concluded then that as long as the current president remained in office, the Soviets would be parried. We stand by this judgment, but analysts point out that there have been assassination attempts against him, and that a change of leaders could indeed change the ball game, as the Soviets have embedded themselves in the country's defense establishment.

NIGERIA

Our pessimism with regard to the passage from military to civilian rule has eased marginally since our last report, but we remain concerned that the Nigerians might, under some circumstances, consider trying to use their oil exports to the US for political leverage. A move to lift sanctions against Rhodesia could produce something along these lines; certainly the thought would occur immediately to most Nigerians interested in the southern African question. There would likely be a lot of pros, cons, and second thoughts about doing something.